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Abstract
This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilib-
rium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small
renegotiation costs can have dramatic eects on the set of equilibria. More
specically, the paper analyzes the innitely repeated Bertrand game. It
is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost there exists a discount
factor such that any collusive prot can be supported as an equilibrium
outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suce to fa-
cilitate collusive outcomes for suciently patient rms. This result stands
in stark contrast to the unique pure-strategy WRP equilibrium without
renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period.
Moreover, in comparison to the ndings of McCutcheon (1997), who states
that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this
result points to a quite dierent conclusion.
Keywords. Noncooperative game theory; Weak renegotiation-
proofness; Costly renegotation; Repeated Bertrand games
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1 Introduction
It is well known that in innitely repeated games, every feasible and individu-
ally rational payo vector can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium
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1(SPE) for suciently high discount factors. This inconclusive result has spurred
a large literature on equilibrium selection, and in this vein Farrell and Maskin's
(1989) concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) has received
considerable attention. In short, WRP considers threats of punishment non-
credible if they hurt all players; the argument being that players would then
prefer to renegotiate back to a collusive outcome rather than staying in the
costly punishment phase, which undermines the credibility of the threat. WRP
and related constructs assume that renegotiation can be initiated without in-
icting any costs on the renegotiating parties.1 However, in many applications,
renegotiation is associated with a cost. For example, rms trying to renegotiate
a collusive agreement after a deviation face the risk of leaving evidence of com-
munication that may be used against them in future allegations. Seen in this
light, renegotiation can hardly be considered as costless. Analyzing the eects of
costly renegotiation is hence central to understanding the role of renegotiation
in many settings and constitutes the purpose of this paper.
More specically, the paper makes a twofold contribution. Firstly, we present
a simple extension of WRP to account for renegotiation costs. To our knowledge
this is the rst attempt to allow for renegotiation costs in a WRP context, and
even though our denition is given for a specic game, it is easily extended to
other settings. Secondly, we analyze the implications of costly renegotiation in
the innitely repeated Bertrand duopoly game. The Bertrand case is interesting
as it has a unique WRP in pure strategies that implies marginal cost pricing
in every period (Farrell and Maskin 1989).2;3 We provide a lower bound on
renegotiation costs, as a function of discount factors, that makes collusion viable,
and show that: (i) for every positive level of renegotiation cost there exists a
discount factor such that collusion is viable, (ii) as the discount factor gets close
to one, any arbitrarily small renegotiation cost will suce to facilitate collusion.
This folk-theorem result stands in stark contrast to both Farrell and Maskin's
(1989) competitive outcome prediction in situations without renegotiation costs,
and McCutcheon (1997) who argues that costs have to be larger than the stage
game collusive prot to support collusion.
The latter point in the previous paragraph deserves some elaboration to
be appreciated. McCutcheon (1997) is set in an antitrust setting where the
nes from being detected by the antitrust authority are treated as a cost of
(re)negotiation.4 Her main contribution is that she provides a lower bound on
renegotiation costs such that if costs are larger than this threshold, collusion is
1See for example Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), Bernheim and Ray (1987) and
Asheim (1991) for related concepts which all assume costless renegotiation.
2In many other applications unfortunately WRP has not been successful in signicantly
reducing the number of attainable equilibrium outcomes. van Damme (1989) shows that WRP
does not eliminate any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in prisoners' dilemma games.
A similar result is shown to hold for Cournot duopolies (Farrell and Maskin 1989) and a
subsequent paper has shown that this result continues to hold for Cournot oligopolies with
fewer than 9 rms (Aramendia and Ruiz 2005).
3In a recent paper Kranz and Ohlendorf (2009) have shown that introducing side payments
changes this result.
4This presumes that explicit meetings are necessary to achieve collusion among rms.
Theory is often silent on these matters, but relies on the underlying assumption of perfect
2possible and otherwise not. In particular, she shows that nes have to be sub-
stantial to facilitate collusion; when rms are very patient, renegotiation costs
have to be above the stage game collusive prot to facilitate collusion. The im-
mediate implication for policy is that antitrust laws prohibiting communication
between rms facilitate, rather than impede, collusion. This controversial result
has rendered numerous citations, but more importantly it has been used in ap-
plied policy work (Final Report for the European Commission 2001) as well as
in economics textbooks (Motta 2004). This result obviously conicts with our
nding that any positive renegotiation cost will enable collusion for suciently
patient rms. We argue that McCutcheon's result is an artifact of a questionable
modeling choice. She uses Farrell and Maskin (1989) to predict a competitive
outcome in a situation without nes. WRP relies on using asymmetric punish-
ments that treat the cheater worse than the cheated. However, McCutcheon
(1997) restricts attention to strategies with symmetric punishments when she
applies Blume (1994) to the case of costly renegotiation.5 This clearly creates
an inconsistency, which, as we show, has dramatic eects.
Further support to our results is given in a recent experimental paper on col-
lusion in repeated Bertrand duopolies with (costly) communication (Andersson
and Wengstr om 2007a). They conduct three treatments with zero, low or high
cost of communication. In particular, the high cost communication treatment is
set up so that the cost is high enough to support collusion both according to our
lower bound, given in Proposition 1, and the lower bound given in McCutcheon.
In contrast, the low communication cost treatment is too low to support col-
lusion according to McCutcheon, but suciently high according to our lower
bound. Andersson and Wengstr om (2007a) report that prices in sessions with
costly communication are higher than in sessions with costless communication,
whereas there is no dierence between prices in sessions with costly communi-
cation; thus giving support to the theory put forward in this paper.
2 Theoretical model
We consider an innitely repeated Bertrand duopoly where each rm i = 1;2
chooses a price pi 2 Pi = R+ in each period t 2 f1;:::;1g = T.6 Assume that
rms have an identical constant marginal cost c and denote the stage game
and frictionless negotiations that occur in the minds of rms. A discussion of what is more
plausible in "reality" would take us far outside the realms of this paper and instead we refer to
Farrell (2000) for a discussion on these matters and Genesove and Mullin (2001) for empirical
evidence of explicit communication between colluding rms.
5Note that we do not argue against Blume's approach per se. We question how McCutcheon
(1997) uses it in her article.
6 The results in this paper are easily extended to games with more than two players. In
line with the concluding remarks in Farrell and Maskin (1989) we, however, argue that WRP
is best suited to describe two player games, since for more players there could be renegotiation
by sub-coalitions, which is not captured.





D(pi) if pi < pj
1
2D(pi) if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
where D(pi) denotes aggregate demand which is assumed to be continuous and
decreasing. Furthermore, let D(0) > c and D(pi) = 0 for pi  pmax > 0.
These assumptions preclude some trivial cases and guarantee that there exists
a monopoly price pm. It is easily realized that the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the stage game is both rms setting price equal to marginal
cost. After each stage, rms learn the price choice of the other rm. Let
 = (1;2) denote a strategy prole.7;8 We denote rm i's present value of
prots i() =
P1
t=1 t 1i(t), where  2 (0;1) is the common discount factor.
Moreover, let () = (1();2()). Before each stage of the game, rms have
the opportunity to renegotiate at cost k > 0.9 This cost is inicted on both
rms in case of renegotiation. Let k denote the vector of renegotiation costs.
We now give a denition of costly WRP which is closely related to the denition
of WRP in Farrell and Maskin (1989).
Denition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium  is k-WRP if there does not exist
any continuation equilibria 1 or 2 of  such that (1)   k  (2) with
strict inequality for at least one element. If  k-WRP then we say that the
corresponding prots are k-WRP.
3 Analysis
We are interested in characterizing the conditions needed to sustain collusive
outcomes as k-WRP equilibria. A rst condition for a strategy to be k-WRP
is that it is a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence we rst need to establish
conditions on  for the existence of non-trivial SPE, in which price is not equal to
marginal cost in every period. From textbook treatments of Bertrand duopolies
we know that this lower bound is given by   1
2.10 Consequently we restrict
attention to  2 [1
2;1). In what follows we assume that rms use the following
strategy, with corresponding prole  .
7As usual i is an innite sequence of maps from the set of histories to the set of stage
game actions.
8In line with McCutcheon (1997) we restrict attention to pure strategies.
9 We assume that an initial agreement has already been set up by the colluding rms and
that this initial agreement is not associated with any cost. The model is easily extended,
without aecting the results, to allow for costly initial agreements as it does not alter the
lower bound on renegotiation cost. Instead it introduces an upper bound on (re)negotiation
cost such that above this bound rms do not meet to set up the initial agreement. Note
that in order for this restraint to be binding the cost has to exceed the present value of all
individual future prot streams from the cartel. Also note that this upper bound would be
identical to the upper bound derived in McCutcheon (1997).
10See for example Tirole (1988).
4 Normal state: Both rms set p =  p 2 (c;pm] at t = 1 and at every t > 1
if for both rms p =  p in the previous period or if rms were in the last
stage of a punishment phase in the previous period.11 Otherwise, rms
revert to the punishment state.
 Punishment state: If rm i deviates at t then rms revert to choosing
pi
j and pi
i for T periods such that pi
j < pi
i. Let i = (i
i;i
j) be the
corresponding stage game prots. If rm i deviates from the punishment,
it restarts. If rm j deviates, it is required to punish itself for T periods
and rm i is reprieved. If both rms deviate then rm 2 is punished. After
T periods rms return to the normal state.
Letting   denote the monopoly prot from setting price  p, we can charac-
terize the lowest renegotiation cost needed to sustain collusive pricing in equi-
librium.
To establish whether a strategy prole   is k-WRP we must check that there
is no collective interest in renegotiating a punishment and paying the cost k.
Now assume that rm i has deviated. Since rm i is then being punished, it
prefers renegotiating and it hence suces to check this requirement for rm j.
Firm j should strictly prefer staying in the punishment to renegotiating and



















1   T : (1)
Clearly, if i
j meets inequality (1) there is no collective interest in renegoti-
ating the punishment since the cheated rm is strictly better o sticking to the
punishment phase.
We also need to check that the strategy prole is an SPE. First, we need to
make sure that no rm has an incentive to deviate from the normal path. That













To nd the lower bound on renegotiation costs, the length of the punishment
phase should be minimized; we therefore dene T() to be the smallest positive
integer satisfying (2), i.e
T()  min







11The restiction  p  pm is without loss of generality.
5A second criterion to ensure that   is SPE is that the punished rm should have
no interest in deviating from the punishment path by undercutting rm j, i.e.



















By comparing inequalities (1) and (4) we see the force of the renegotiation
cost k. In essence it introduces a wedge between i
j and the collusive prot  =2
in (1), which can subsequently be used to avoid deviations from the punishment
path in (4).
Replacing i








which sets a lower bound on the renegotiation cost. We can summarize our
results in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 If k > k() then   is k-WRP.
We notice that if a particular prot is k-WRP then any collusive prot
is k-WRP, which is a common property in the repeated Bertrand game. An
interesting question is whether we, for every k > 0, can nd discount factors
such that collusion is viable. From the previous paragraph it is clear that
for large k, collusion can be easily sustained since it eectively prevents any
protable renegotiation attempt and still provides room for repentance to the
cheated rm. For small k it is not so obvious. The model in McCutcheon (1997)
provides a negative answer to this question. In contrast, Theorem 1 shows that
this is indeed the case in our model.
Theorem 1 For any k > 0 there exists  2 (0;1) such that   is k-WRP.
A proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix. By the denition of  
it is clear that any positive stage game prot can be implemented as a k-WRP
prot for suciently large . An immediate corollary to Theorem 1 is that even
an innitely small renegotiation cost can support collusive equilibria, given that
rms are patient enough.12 In Figure 1 we have plotted k() for  2 (0:5;1).
The jumps for low  are due to the changes in the minimal punishment length
T(). However, by studying equation (3) we see that T() = 2 for all  
 1=2 + 1=2
p
5  0:62. For  above this threshold it can be easily shown that
12However, Farrell and Maskin (1989) have shown that, for k = 0 and  suciently close to
one, the unique WRP equilibrium entails marginal cost pricing in every period. This lack of
continuity at the limit might seem troublesome but Andersson and Wengstr om (2007b) have












Figure 1: An example with   = 1
k() is strictly decreasing in , hence implying that if, for xed k, collusion is
viable at some particular    0:62, then collusion is viable for all    . Indeed,
the reader can verify that that the result in Theorem 1 is not merely a "limit"
result.
Finally we compare our results to those in McCutcheon (1997). First, note
that she uses the same punishment length as we do when deriving her lower
bound on renegotiation costs. It is hence straightforward to compare our lower






Comparing the two lower bounds in Figure 1, it is clear that c() > k() in
the relevant range of . In particular, for any  , as  ! 1  the lower bound
k() converges to zero while c() converges to  . Clearly, she cannot derive an
equivalent to Theorem 1 using her setup.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we show that any strictly positive renegotiation cost will suce to
enable collusion according to our denition. More generally, this result conforms
to the folk theorem and, hence, renegotiation opportunities cannot be seen as
a serious impediment to collusion in Bertrand games. Drawing a parallel to
7the policy conclusions in McCutcheon (1997), our Proposition 1 highlights that
making renegotiation cheap does not prevent rms from sustaining collusive
agreements. Indeed, given that it is very likely that some costs will always be
associated with collusive agreements, irrespective of antitrust nes, it is hard to
support her conclusion that these nes should be kept low. To the contrary, the
only alternative left to consider is to rule out the initial agreement and hence
expected antitrust nes should be larger than the discounted stream of future
collusive prots. A potential objection to our argument is that the limit result
is a special case. However, McCutcheon (1997) obtains a discount factor of
 = 0:99969, a number fairly close to one, when she calibrates her model using
historical data. Accordingly, we argue that the limiting case is indeed relevant
for policy application. In addition, the experimental results in Andersson and
Wengstr om (2007a) favor our model over McCutcheon (1997).
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In what follows, we will establish that, for any k > 0, there exists some  2
(0:5;1) such that   is k-WRP. More precisely, we proceed by xing k > 0 and
study k as  increases towards one. It is important to pay attention since T()
depends on .
The RHS of the inequality in (3) is strictly greater than one for  < 1, hence





















x a nite T > 0 and turn attention to nding the lower bound of communication
costs, k, needed to sustain   as k-WRP. By applying L'H^ opital's rule to the













(1   T)  T  T 1
= 0.
Given, k > 0 there clearly exists  < 1 such that k > k. Using Proposition
1 the result follows.
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